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Abstract—The need for countering Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) attacks has led to the solutions that ubiquitously monitor
system activities in each enterprise host, and perform timely
abnormal system behavior detection over the stream of monitor-
ing data. However, existing stream-based solutions lack explicit
language constructs for expressing anomaly models that capture
abnormal system behaviors, thus facing challenges in incorpo-
rating expert knowledge to perform timely anomaly detection over
the large-scale monitoring data. To address these limitations, we
build SAQL, a novel stream-based query system that takes as
input, a real-time event feed aggregated from multiple hosts
in an enterprise, and provides an anomaly query engine that
queries the event feed to identify abnormal behaviors based on
the specified anomaly models. SAQL provides a domain-specific
query language, Stream-based Anomaly Query Language (SAQL),
that uniquely integrates critical primitives for expressing major
types of anomaly models. In the demo, we aim to show the
complete usage scenario of SAQL by (1) performing an APT
attack in a controlled environment, and (2) using SAQL to detect
the abnormal behaviors in real time by querying the collected
stream of system monitoring data that contains the attack traces.
The audience will have the option to interact with the system and
detect the attack footprints in real time via issuing queries and
checking the query results through a command-line UI.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced cyber attacks and data breaches plague even the
most protected businesses [7], [5]. Similar attacks, especially
in the form of Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), are being
commonly observed. These attacks consist of a sequence of
steps across many hosts that exploit different types of vulner-
abilities to compromise security. To counter these attacks, ap-
proaches based on ubiquitous system monitoring have emerged
as an important solution for monitoring system activities and
actively detecting possible abnormal system behaviors [13],
[15], [10], [9]. System monitoring observes system calls at
the kernel level to collect system-level events that record
interactions among system entities (e.g., processes, files, and
network connections). Collection of system monitoring data
enables security analysts to detect abnormal system behaviors
by continuously searching for anomalies from the streaming
data [8], [14].
Fighting against advanced attacks such as APTs is a time-
critical mission. As such, there is a strong need for a real-
time anomaly detection system that can find a “needle in a
haystack” from system monitoring data for preventing addi-
tional damage and performing system recovery. However, there
are two major challenges for building such system to support
effective and timely anomaly detection: (1) Expert Knowledge
Incorporation: Advanced attacks typically involve multiple
steps exploiting various types of vulnerabilities. Besides, mod-
els derived from data have been increasingly used in detecting
various types of abnormal behaviors [14]. System adminis-
trators, security analysts, and data scientists have extensive
domain knowledge about the enterprise, including the expected
system behaviors. Fighting against such attacks requires the
system to provide a unified interface for expressing a broad
range of anomaly models while incorporating the domain
knowledge from experts; (2) Timely Big-Data Analytics: Sys-
tem monitoring produces huge amount of daily logs (∼50GB
for 100 hosts per day) [13], [15]. This requires the system to
provide efficient real-time data analytics.
Unfortunately, none of the existing systems [11], [12], [6],
[1] provide a comprehensive solution that addresses both of
these inherent challenges. Existing anomaly detection systems
focus on building models for specific anomalies based on
extracted features, rather than providing a unified interface for
expressing a broad range of anomaly models via incorporating
the expert knowledge. Existing stream-based query systems
are designed to work with general-purpose data streams,
and lack explicit language constructs for expressing various
anomaly models for our particular problem domain. Further-
more, to support multiple concurrent queries that access differ-
ent attributes of the data, these systems have to make multiple
copies of the data for the queries, and thus is not efficient in
handling the big data collected from system monitoring.
To address these challenges, we build SAQL [9], a stream-
based query system that enables security analysts to perform
real-time abnormal system behavior detection via querying
the stream of system monitoring data. SAQL takes as input
a real-time event feed aggregated from multiple hosts in an
enterprise, and provides an anomaly query engine that queries
the event feed to identify abnormal system behaviors based
on the specified anomaly models. To facilitate the task of
expert knowledge incorporation, SAQL provides a domain-
specific query language, Stream-based Anomaly Query Lan-
guage (SAQL), that uniquely integrates a series of critical
primitives for expressing a broad range of anomaly mod-
els. In particular, SAQL provides (1) the syntax of event
patterns for specifying relevant system activities and their
relationships, which facilitates the specification of rule-based
anomaly models; (2) the constructs for sliding windows and
stateful computation that allow stateful anomaly models to be
computed in each sliding window over the data stream. These
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Fig. 1: The architecture of SAQL
constructs facilitate the specification of time-series anomaly
models, invariant-based anomaly models, and outlier-based
anomaly models, which lack support from existing stream-
based query systems. To facilitate the task of efficiently han-
dling concurrent queries, SAQL employs a master-dependent-
query scheme that groups semantically compatible queries to
minimize the data copies of the stream. Our anomaly query
engine leverages the domain-specific characteristics of the
system monitoring data and the semantics of the queries to
efficiently schedule the execution.
We have deployed the SAQL system in NEC Labs America
comprising 150 hosts and made a demo video [4]. In our demo,
we aim to show the complete usage scenario of SAQL. To
achieve this goal, we perform an APT attack in a controlled
environment (for protecting the normal business) that exploits
multiple vulnerabilities in the system and exfiltrates sensitive
data from database server. The system monitoring data that
contains the attack traces is collected by our data collection
agents and sent to the central server, forming an event stream.
We constructed a set of SAQL queries in advanced for detect-
ing the attack behaviors and deployed them over the stream.
These SAQL queries will continuously monitor the stream and
report the alerts in real time as we perform the attack. To easily
reproduce the attack data for showcasing different queries, we
additionally store the data in databases and have built a stream
replayer to replay the data from databases as a data stream. The
audience will have the option to interact with the system and
detect the attack footprints via issuing queries and checking
the query results through a command-line UI.
II. THE SAQL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the SAQL system. SAQL
takes an input query from the user that specifies certain attack
behaviors to be detected, executes the query by checking
the specified behaviors against the system event stream, and
reports the detection alerts once there exist matches.
A. Data Collection
System monitoring records kernel-level interactions among
system entities as system events. Each of the recorded event
occurs on a particular host at a particular time, thus exhibiting
strong spatial and temporal properties. Following the estab-
lished convention [13], [15], [9], [10], in our data model,
we consider system entities as files, processes, and network
connections. We consider a system event as the interaction
between two system entities represented as 〈subject, opera-
tion, object〉 (SVO). Subjects are processes originating from
software applications (e.g., Firefox), and objects can be files,
processes, and network connections. We categorize system
events into three types according to their objects, namely file
events, process events, and network events.
We build data collection agents based on mature system
monitoring frameworks: auditd for Linux, ETW for Windows,
and DTrace for MacOS. Our agents are deployed across
servers, desktops, and laptops in the enterprise to collect
system auditing events from kernels. The collected events
with critical security-related attributes (e.g., file name, process
executable name, PID, IP, port; more details in [9]) are sent
to the central server, forming an event stream.
B. SAQL Query Language
We build the SAQL language using ANTLR 4. Our language
uniquely integrates a series of critical primitives for concisely
expressing four major types of anomaly models.
1) Rule-based Anomaly Model: SAQL provides explicit
constructs to specify system entities/events, attribute con-
straints, and event temporal/attribute relationships. This facili-
tates the specification of rule-based anomaly models to detect
known attack behaviors or enforce enterprise-wide security
policies. Query 1 shows a SAQL query that detects the data
exfiltration from database server: the attacker leverages OSQL
utility (osql.exe) to dump the database content (backup1.dmp
) and then runs a malware (sbblv.exe) to send the dump
back to his host (XXX.129). Four event patterns are declared
(Lines 2-5) with a global constraints (Line 1), a temporal
relationship (Line 6), and an implicit attribute relationship
(Lines 3-4 specify the same f1 in both events). Desired
attributes of matched events are returned (Line 7) with context-
aware syntax shortcuts adopted (i.e., p1 → p1.exe_name).
1 agentid = xxx // SQL database server (obfuscated)
2 proc p1["%cmd.exe"] start proc p2["%osql.exe"] as evt1
3 proc p3["%sqlservr.exe"] write file f1["%backup1.dmp"] as
evt2
4 proc p4["%sbblv.exe"] read file f1 as evt3
5 proc p4 read || write ip i1[dstip="XXX.129"] as evt4
6 with evt1 -> evt2 -> evt3 -> evt4
7 return distinct p1, p2, p3, f1, p4, i1 // p1 -> p1.exe_name
, i1 -> i1.dstip, f1 -> f1.name
Query 1: A rule-based SAQL query
2) Time-Series Anomaly Model: SAQL provides explicit
constructs for sliding windows and stateful computation that
allow stateful anomaly models to be computed in each sliding
window over the stream. These constructs lay the foundation
for specifying advanced anomaly models (i.e., time-series
anomaly models, invariant-based anomaly models), which lack
support from existing stream-based query systems [11], [12],
[6], [1]. Query 2 shows a SAQL query that specifies a time-
series anomaly model to monitor the network usage of each
application and raises an alert when the network usage is
abnormally high. It specifies a 10-minute sliding window (Line
1), collects the amount of data sent through network within
each window (Lines 2-4), and computes the moving average
to detect spikes of network data transfers (Line 5). In the
query, ss[0] represents the state of the current window while
ss[1] and ss[2] represent the states of the two past windows
respectively (ss[2] occurs earlier than ss[1]).
1 proc p write ip i as evt #time(10 min)
2 state[3] ss {
3 avg_amount := avg(evt.amount)
4 } group by p
5 alert (ss[0].avg_amount > (ss[0].avg_amount + ss[1].
avg_amount + ss[2].avg_amount) / 3) && (ss[0].
avg_amount > 10000)
6 return p, ss[0].avg_amount, ss[1].avg_amount, ss[2].
avg_amount
Query 2: A time-series SAQL query
3) Invariant-based Anomaly Model: SAQL provides ex-
plicit constructs for learning invariants of system behaviors
under normal operations and using the learned invariants to
detect later violations. This facilitates the specification of
invariant-based anomaly models. Query 3 shows a SAQL query
that specifies a 10-second sliding window (Line 1), maintains
a set of child processes spawned by the Apache process (Lines
2-4), uses the first ten windows to train the invariant (Lines
5-8), and detects unseen child processes spawned by Apache
(Line 9).
1 proc p1["%apache.exe"] start proc p2 as evt #time(10 s)
2 state ss {
3 set_proc := set(p2.exe_name)
4 } group by p1
5 invariant[10][offline] {
6 a := empty_set // invariant init
7 a = a union ss.set_proc //invariant update
8 }
9 alert |ss.set_proc diff a| > 0
10 return p1, ss.set_proc
Query 3: An invariant-based SAQL query
4) Outlier-based Anomaly Model: SAQL provides explicit
constructs for grouping system behaviors together to detect
outliers. This facilitates the specification of outlier-based
anomaly models. Query 4 shows a SAQL query that specifies
a 10-minute sliding window (Line 2), computes the amount
of data sent through network by the sqlservr.exe process for
each outgoing IP address (Lines 3-5), and identifies the outliers
using DBSCAN clustering (Lines 6-7) to detect the suspicious
IP that triggers the database dump. Note that Line 6 specifies
which information of the state forms a comparison point and
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Fig. 2: Demonstration setup for the APT attack
Fig. 3: Command-line UI of the SAQL system
how the “distance” among these points should be computed
("ed" represents Euclidean Distance).
1 agentid = xxx // SQL database server (obfuscated)
2 proc p["%sqlservr.exe"] read || write ip i as evt #time(10
min)
3 state ss {
4 amt := sum(evt.amount)
5 } group by i.dstip
6 cluster(points=all(ss.amt), distance="ed", method="DBSCAN
(100000, 5)")
7 alert cluster.outlier && ss.amt > 1000000
8 return i.dstip, ss.amt
Query 4: An outlier-based SAQL query
C. SAQL Query Execution Engine
We build the SAQL system upon Siddhi CEP [6] so that our
system can leverage Siddhi’s mature mechanisms to manage
the event stream. Given an input SAQL query, the multievent
matcher matches the events in the stream against the event
patterns specified in the query. If the query involves stateful
computation, the state maintainer maintains the states of
each sliding window computed from the matched events. To
efficiently handle the execution of multiple concurrent queries,
the concurrent query scheduler employs a master-dependent-
query scheme. In the scheme, concurrent queries are divided
into groups based their semantic compatibilities, with each
group having a master query and several dependent queries.
The scheme enforces that the queries in a group will share
a single copy of the stream data for execution. Only master
queries have direct access to the data stream, and the execution
of the dependent queries leverages the intermediate execution
results of their master query. In this way, unnecessary data
copies of the stream can be significantly reduced. The error
reporter reports the errors during the query execution. Alerts
are generated when the alert conditions specified in the query
are matched by the event stream.
III. DEMONSTRATION OUTLINE
Demonstration Setup for The APT Attack. We deployed
SAQL in NEC Labs America comprising 150 hosts. The
purpose of our demo is to illustrate the complete usage
scenario of SAQL and showcase its superiority in enabling
timely abnormal system behavior detection. To achieve this
goal, we perform an APT attack in a controlled environment
(Figure 2) using known exploits. The APT attack consists of
five steps as follows:
c1 Initial Compromise: The attacker sends a crafted email
to the victim. The email contains an Excel file with a
malicious macro embedded.
c2 Malware Infection: The victim opens the Excel file through
the Outlook client and runs the macro, which downloads
and executes a malicious script (CVE-2008-0081 [2]) to
open a backdoor for the attacker.
c3 Privilege Escalation: The attacker enters the victim’s ma-
chine through the backdoor, scans the network ports to dis-
cover the IP address of the database, and runs the database
cracking tool (gsecdump.exe) to steal the credentials of
the database.
c4 Penetration into Database Server: Using the credentials,
the attacker penetrates into the database server and delivers
a VBScript to drop another malicious script, which creates
another backdoor.
c5 Data Exfiltration: With the access to the database server,
the attacker dumps the database content using osql.exe
and sends the data dump back to his host.
Construction of SAQL Queries. We constructed 8 SAQL
queries (more details in [3]) in advance for detecting the
attack behaviors. For each attack step, we construct a rule-
based SAQL query by leveraging the knowledge of the attack.
Furthermore, we construct three advanced anomaly queries,
assuming no knowledge of the attack details:
• We construct an invariant-based anomaly query to detect the
scenario where Excel executes a malicious script that it has
never executed before (i.e., step c2): The invariant contains
all unique processes started by Excel in the first 100 sliding
windows. New processes that deviate from the invariant are
reported as alerts.
• We construct a time-series anomaly query based on SMA to
detect the scenario where abnormally high volumes of data
are exchanged via network on the database server (i.e., step
c5): For every process on the database server, this query
detects the processes that transfer abnormally high volumes
of data to the network.
• We construct an outlier-based anomaly query to detect
processes that transfer high volumes of data to the network
(i.e., step c5): The query detects such processes through peer
comparison based on DBSCAN.
Demonstration Procedure. We start the demonstration
by constructing and executing the SAQL queries using a
command-line UI (Figure 3). As we perform the attack, the
Fig. 4: Stream replayer
SAQL queries will continuously monitor the stream and report
the alerts when the abnormal attack behaviors are detected.
To easily reproduce the streaming attack data for show-
casing different queries, we additionally store the data in
databases and have built a stream replayer to replay the data
from databases as a data stream. Our stream replayer has a
web-based UI (Figure 4) that lets us choose the hosts and the
start/end time to replay the system monitoring data.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented SAQL, a novel system for detecting ab-
normal system behaviors in enterprises via querying streaming
system monitoring data. SAQL provides an expressive domain-
specific language to express a wide range of anomaly models.
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